Aiming to achieve this reduction at the lowest possible cost, the law also creates a national market for SO ''allowances.'' Each allowance grants its bearer the right to 2 emit one ton of SO during or after the year in which it was issued. Phase I of the 2 law, which began on January 1, 1995, affects 110 of the dirtiest coal plants. Each affected ''unit'' will be granted allowances in an amount based upon production levels during a 1985᎐87 base period. The annual endowment will be sufficient to Ž . permit units to emit SO equaling 2.5 pounds per million Btu mmBtu of 2 base-period heat input. Phase II begins in the year 2000 and affects all coal-burning electric utility plants with a capacity of at least 25 MW. The Phase II restriction is more stringent, with endowments of allowances equivalent to an emission rate of no more than 1.2 pounds per million Btu. 2 Economists have long advocated the use of markets to control pollution. Pigou w x w x 22 introduced the now-familiar cost savings potential of pollution taxes. Dales 8 elaborated upon Pigou's insight, suggesting the usefulness of tradable pollution w x permits in environmental control. Montgomery 21 proved formally that when markets are competitive and information is perfect no alternative regulatory scheme can achieve a given environmental standard at a lower cost than a permit-trading scheme. The literature following Dales and Montgomery is now w x w x vast; for surveys see Tietenberg 27 and Baumol and Oates 2 . For the purposes of this discussion the striking feature of the CAAA is the fact that a preferred policy prescription of economists is to be practiced on a national scale.
How well will this market work? On the eve of its formal opening, at least three crucial questions regarding the market's performance remain open. One is the effect that uncertainty will have on utilities' behavior in the market. Hahn and w x Hester 16 argue that uncertainty about the institutional arrangements themselves has hampered previous attempts to implement market-based pollution control schemes. A second is the economic regulation of utilities by state public service commissions, whose ratemaking treatment of allowances promises to affect the Ž w x w x. market in important ways Bohi and Burtraw 4 ; Coggins and Smith 7 . A third is Ž w x. the differential regulatory treatment of utilities across states Hahn and May 17 . The savings to be had if the allowance market works well appear to be sizable. By one account the market itself can yield cost savings as high as $2 or $3 billion Ž w x. annually Portney 23 . In short, the stakes involved in the market are high and a great deal turns on whether it performs as hoped by its framers. If it does, the market should transmit price signals to participants that will distribute abatement optimally across utilities. At an equilibrium in a well-functioning allowance market, one might expect the observed allowance price to equal the marginal cost of achieving the last unit of abatement. 3 But herein lies a conundrum for thoseᎏincluding utility compliance planners, state public service commissions, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Ž . U.S. EPA ᎏwho must participate in or otherwise influence the allowance market: compliance decision making, including decisions regarding allowance market participation, requires knowledge of the allowance price. But the allowance price cannot be known with certainty before the market begins. How might one gather price information in a nascent market of this kind? Two primary sources are currently available: a handful of trades that have already taken place for which prices are publicly available and the allowance auctions conducted in 1993 on behalf of the EPA by the Chicago Board of Trade. 4 Allowances changed hands in 2 Congress chose the term ''allowance'' to describe the object that economists usually call a ''pollution permit.'' We will use the newer term. A plant can consist of more than one ''unit,'' which can w x be thought of as a single boiler. See Lock and Harkawik 20 for an overview of the CAAA.
3 w x However, see Chao and Wilson 6 . They argue that in a dynamic setting, because a decision to purchase allowances is reversible but a scrubber purchase is not, allowance prices should actually exceed marginal abatement costs. 4 The abatement cost estimates from large-scale utility industry models provide a third source of Ž w x. information EPRI 10 . These estimates have, for the most part, been higher than prices observed actual trades through October 1993 at prices ranging from $170 to $400. The 1993 EPA allowance auctions yielded prices ranging from $131 to $450 for Phase I Ž . allowances with an average of $156.60 and from $122 to $310 for Phase II Ž . allowances with an average of $136.19 . Though these are useful figures, it is difficult for a number of reasons to treat them as definitive indicators of the actual value of an SO allowance. The variability in observed prices, and the newness of 2 the institutions themselves, make it difficult to predict allowance prices in future years. 5 On the whole, the allowance market has been less active than was once hoped, and some observers have warned that the apparent reluctance on the part of utilities to rely on allowance purchases to achieve compliance may cripple the market and drive up Title IV compliance costs. 6 This paper introduces into the SO compliance literature a method developed by 2 w x w x Fare and Grosskopf 12 and employed recently by Fare et al. 14 for use ind educing the price of a pollutant from plant-level data on the underlying technical relationship between inputs and multiple outputsᎏincluding the output of one or more pollutants. In an empirical application of the method, we also provide an estimate of the average shadow price of SO abatement for Wisconsin coal-burning 2 electric plants. We suggest that this price can be interpreted as the value of an allowance to the plants in the study.
The technical approach to the problem of estimating shadow prices for a pollutant involves specifying a multiple-output production technology in which Ž . pollutants are considered to be bad outputs. Employing a weak disposability assumption, we specify and estimate a parametric output distance function that can be used to calculate production efficiencies for each plant in our data set. Using a duality argument, one can combine the estimated distance function with electricity price information to derive a shadow price for SO , the undesirable output. 2 Our shadow price calculations provide an indication of the marginal cost to Wisconsin coal plants of reducing their SO emissions. The results appear to be 2 reasonable, falling within the range of recently observed allowance prices. The application of the paper thus constitutes a validation of the distance function methodology we employ, a methodology that shows promise in other environmental control problems. A shortcoming of our application, however, is that none of the Ž . plants in our data set are fitted with flue-gas desulfurization units scrubbers . One of the industry-wide compliance alternatives is the installation of scrubbers, which permit a plant to reduce SO emissions while continuing to burn coal with a high 2 sulfur content. The installation of scrubbers amounts to an important technological option we cannot address.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we develop the analytical model and describe the empirical method for estimating shadow prices. In Section III the data set is described. Section IV contains the empirical results. Section V provides an interpretation of the results, including a discussion of how they might bear upon the national allowance market. Concluding remarks appear in Section VI.
5 w x Cason 5 shows that the EPA's allowance auction, by design, can be expected to exhibit downward biased prices. 
II. THE OUTPUT DISTANCE FUNCTION AND SHADOW PRICES
Suppose that a coal-burning electric utility plant employs a vector of inputs x g R R N to produce a vector of outputs u g R R
M
. 13 , to capture the idea that the firm cannot reduce its emissions of u without reducing production of the desirable output, we assume 2 Ž . that the technology satisfies weak disposability. The technology P P x satisfies weak w Ž .x w Ž .x w x disposability if u g P P x implies that u g P P x for every g 0, 1 . Figure 1 depicts a technology satisfying weak disposability. For a treatment of the properties Ž . w x w x w x that P P x customarily satisfies, see Shephard 25 , Diewert 9 , or Fare 11 . An alternative representation of the technology, conveying the same informa-Ž . tion, is the output distance function. For any x, u pair, the output distance function is defined from the technology by of the distance function and their relation to the technology appear in Shephard w x w x Ž . 25 and in Diewert 9 . In short, D x, u is continuous, increasing and convex in u for each x, homogeneous of degree 1 in outputs, and quasi-concave and decreasing in x.
Note that the output distance function contains information about the efficiency Ž . Ž . of a given pair x, u . Indeed, one can take the inverse of D x, u to be a measure Ž w x. Ž . of output efficiency Farrell 15 . If D x, u s 1 then production is technically Ž . efficient; the set of output vectors for which there is an x at which D x, u s 1 traces out the production frontier in R R
Ž . The technology representations P P x and D x, u rely only upon the data of Ž . input and output quantities. If one also knows one or more actual undeflated output prices, the duality between technology and revenue permits one to estimate the actual shadow prices of outputs. In a multi-output model in which all outputs are desirable, the familiar optimality condition requires that for any two outputs the slope of the production possibilities frontier should equal the ratio of the corresponding output prices. One can apply the same reasoning to the present problem, except that undesirable outputs will have negative shadow prices. Let r g R R M denote a vector of output prices, and let the revenue function be defined Ž . Ä Ž . 4 w x from the distance function as R x, r s sup ru: D x, u F 1 . Shephard 25 shows u that under certain regularity conditions the following dual relationships will be satisfied: 
Ž . We seek the actual undeflated shadow price for undesirable outputs, r , with i i / 1. In order to obtain this value it is necessary to know the actual value of r . 1 Let us therefore assume that the price of u , the desirable output, is known and 1 known to equal its undeflated shadow price, r 0 . 7 Then for each output i / 1 we
In this setting, the shadow price is interpreted as marginal revenue, the output distance function being a primal object whose dual is a revenue function. In our empirical application, the firms are rate-of-return regulated utilities, for whom output prices clearly equal marginal revenue, even though one can expect regulatory treatment to drive a wedge between output price and marginal cost. Ž The familiar optimality condition the equality between an output price ratio and . Ž. the slope of the production frontier contained in 4 is depicted in Fig. 1 for the case in which u is an undesirable output. Its shadow price is negative, capturing 2 the notion that the output of u can be reduced only with an accompanying 2 Ž . reduction in u . For a pollutant the value r x, u is the marginal abatement cost. 1 2 Our aim in the following empirical section is to estimate SO shadow prices for a 2 collection of coal-burning electric utility plants and to use this information to gain some insight into the performance and effects of the nascent allowance-trading market. w x Following Fare et al. 14 we chose a parametric form for the output distancë function. Though one could employ nonparametric methods, certain advantages Ž . accompany the parametric version. Among them is the fact that D x, u can be Ž . 8 differentiated, allowing one to make use of 4 . We suppose that the distance function takes the translog form
This function is estimated as a nonstochastic linear programming problem, followw x ing the method spelled out in Fare et al. 14 . Let k s 1, . . . , K index thë Ž k k . observations in a data set. The objective function is Ý ln D x , u . It is maximized k subject to a number of constraints, including symmetry and homogeneity con-
k is nonnegative for productive outputs and nonpositive for undesirable
outputs; iii Ý ␣ s 1 and Ý ␣ s Ý ␥ s 0; and iv ␣ s ␣ and ␤ s ␤ . In
each of these expressions the relevant indices run over their respective ranges. Ž k k . To sum up, an efficient firm in the sense used here is one with D x , u s 1.
Ž k k . The homogeneity of ln D x , u in u requires that as production of both outputs increases proportionally with x fixed, the distance function increases in the same proportion; that is, the firm becomes more efficient. Another result of these restrictions is that the undesirable outputᎏpollutionᎏmust have a nonpositive shadow price.
III. THE DATA
The empirical work examined here uses plant-level data taken from 14 Wisconsin coal-burning electric utility plants owned and operated by the state's largest 8 We find an ability to differentiate the distance function useful, but not critical. If one were to estimate a nonparametric version it would still be possible to estimate the shadow prices, at least within certain bounds. Given our decision to use a parametric distance function, the choice of a translog w x specification is supported in the literature. Kopp and Smith 19 estimate a single-output stochastic production frontier for a data set of steam electric generation plants. They find evidence favoring the translog form. Table I .
Output Quantities and Price

Ž
. Electricity output is in kilowatt-hours per year kWhryr , measured at the purchasers' meters. Electricity prices are also based upon delivered quantities. These prices are plant averages, weighted by quantities delivered to each ratepayer classification and deflated by the GDP price index to constant 1992 dollars. Prices for the investor-owned plants are retail prices. The cooperative-owned plants sell only to the wholesale market, so that only the wholesale prices are available. Because production decisions are based upon these prices, however, we believe that marginal revenue and shadow prices are properly based upon them as well.
The WDNR records annual emissions of SO , in tons, for each unit at each 2 plant. It uses three methods of calculating emission levels: engineering calculations, stack tests, and automatic determination from subsystem source classification codes. Because one can apply different methods to different units at the same plant, it is difficult to summarize the emissions data by measurement method. Our data are taken directly from the WDNR sources.
10
Input Quantities
Four inputs to the electricity ᎐SO production process are included in the model: Ž . unit-level coal throughput numbers in tons reported to the FERC were aggregated up to the plant level to obtain annual coal use. Each ton of coal contains both usable energy, in mmBtu, and sulfur. Average mmBtu and sulfur content are also available from the FERC, enabling us to calculate the levels of these two inputs for each plant.
The labor variable is calculated from FERC Form 1, which records the number of employees per plant. We assumed that each employee is full-time and worked 2000 hours per year. Thus, we calculated total labor hours per plant by multiplying the workers by 2000. The capital variable was taken from the same form, on which the value of total productive capital is recorded at the plant level. As with all of the dollar-denominated variables, we deflated the capital values using the GDP price index to constant 1992 dollars.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Ž .
Equation 5 was solved as a linear programming problem using the 42 observations and subject to the collection of constraints from Section II. The resulting parameter estimates appear in Table II 11 At the estimated parameter values, the output distance function obeyed nearly all of the properties Ž . expected of it. It was monotone in outputs increasing in u , decreasing in u and it was convex in 1 2 outputs and quasi-concave in inputs at all of the 42 observations. Evaluated at the means of the data, Ž . D x, u was monotone in all inputs except labor. In this regard our results resemble those of Fare et al. Žw x . 14 , p. 378n . dry-bottom plants. As before, lower shadow prices are associated with higher emission rates, which indicates that abatement could be achieved at a lower cost at the cyclone plants.
For the plants in our data set, the absence of scrubbers implies that compliance options are limited to technology and fuel choices. In general, holding other characteristics of the fuel constant, coal prices rise as sulfur content falls. The question arises, then, about how the shadow prices we have calculated compare to the market-driven ''sulfur premium'' that low-sulfur coals command and, by extension, to the cost of reducing SO emissions by purchasing such coal. The answer to 2 this complicated question depends in many ways upon the properties of each boiler and on the various properties of different coals. Our data sources are insufficiently detailed to permit a comprehensive examination of this question. But for illustrative purposes, we provide for one particular coal source a calculation of the hypothetical cost to our average plant of reducing SO emissions by 1 ton solely 2 through the purchase of one type of eastern low-sulfur coal. w The example is based upon 1992 coal prices contained in Table 5 -3 of EPRI 10, x p. 5᎐7 . Suppose the plant in question purchases coal from central Appalachia and can burn either low-or medium-sulfur coal from that region, alternative fuels that we assume are identical aside from their sulfur content. The two fuels contain 40 and 60 pounds of sulfur per ton, respectively. At the reported prices of $23.60 and $22.60 per ton, respectively, the incremental cost of reducing the total sulfur content of the fuel by 1 ton is $100. At our average plant, the ratio of SO 2 emissions by weight to sulfur in coal is 1.869. Using this factor, the cost of reducing SO emissions by 1 ton through low-sulfur coal purchases is $186.902, slightly 2 higher than prices at which allowances have traded to date. This is 36.1% below the average shadow price of $292.70 we have calculated for Wisconsin plants. By 12 The fraction of coal sulfur content that is converted to SO in a dry-bottom plant depends 2 critically upon the chemical make-up of the coalᎏparticularly its calcium content. When coals with a high calcium content are burned, some of the sulfur is captured in the ash, bound chemically to the particulate emissions. This is known as the ''dolomitic effect.'' w x comparison, EPRI 10 estimates that Phase II sulfur premiums will most likely be at least $350. Once again, the number from our example should rise as emission rates fall in Phase II. The coal price differential in our example would need to equal $1.57 per ton in order to make it equivalent to our estimated average shadow price. These numbers indicate that the plants in our data set could achieve reductions in their SO emissions at relatively low cost simply through purchasing 2 coal of lower sulfur content. Indeed, switching to low-sulfur coal has been a primary abatement strategy for Wisconsin utilities to date and it appears they will meet the Phase I requirement in this fashion.
Though the issue is not settled, a good deal of evidence suggests that rate-of-re-Ž turn regulation of utilities causes firms to use a nonoptimal mix of inputs see w x . Joskow and Rose 18 for a survey of the empirical evidence . The question arises, then, about whether our technology-based estimation procedure remains valid. Because the plants in our sample face the same regulatory authority, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, we believe firmly that it is. The regulatory framework, for which we have not accounted explicitly, is nevertheless embedded in our data. But this inclusion presents no difficulty if one supposes, as we do, that the efficient plants are employing inputs in an optimal manner subject to the regulatory constraint. If one were to estimate the model using data from more than one state, it would become possible to study the differential effect of regulatory treatment across states. This question we defer to a later study.
V. REGULATION AND THE SO ALLOWANCE MARKET 2
Given the current shortage of allowance price information, our finding concerning the average shadow price of SO emissions for Wisconsin electric utilities, and 2 the method for calculating it, can help compliance planners and others with an interest in the market. The method yields an estimate of the shadow price of SO 2 for each plant, information that utility managers might use in devising compliance strategies. Perhaps the leading virtue of the method is its relatively modest data requirements. In particular, it obviates any need to gather price and quantity information from the allowance market. As the allowance market begins to operate in earnest and Phase I of the acid rain title of the CAAA comes into effect, it will become possible to estimate allowance demand and supply relationships econometrically. Until then, approaches like ours can yield at least a hint of the prices that will prevail.
Our results are specific to the Wisconsin utility industry. How much, then, can we say about the national allowance market? Some qualifications naturally come to mind when one attempts to illuminate the larger market with our work. One important example is the lack of scrubbers at Wisconsin coal plants. This condition has a direct bearing on our technology model, for the presence of scrubbers on some plants would certainly influence estimation of the output distance function. If data for plants with scrubbers were included, a comparison like that in our Table IVᎏthis time aggregating plants according to the presence or absence of scrubbers ᎏwould be possible. The results would yield insights into the effect of scrubbers on both technical efficiency and emission rates and levels.
Our results are also influenced by Wisconsin's own innovative and relatively stringent acid rain legislation. Since the beginning of 1993, each of the state's major utilities has been required to emit, on average, no more than 1.2 pounds of SO per mmBtu across all plants. Recall that in Phase I of the CAAA, affected 2 units will be given enough allowances to emit at the rate of 2.5 pounds per mmBtu; in Phase II, 1.2 pounds. Although the Wisconsin law appears to match the Phase II restriction, in fact it is intermediate between Phases I and II. The key difference is that emission rates are averaged across all of a utility's plants, including nuclear and gas-fired plants, which emit almost no SO . Thus, utilities can meet the 2 requirements of the state law while emission rates from coal-fired plants remain well above 1.2 pounds per mmBtu. Wisconsin's law also permits emission trades between utilities on a one-to-one basis, subject to certain mild restrictions on total emissions after the trade. 13 Table V shows the annual average emission rates for the three years covered by our sample. It shows, as well, that the utilities were on a trajectory toward compliance with the state law during this time. Emission rates fell from 2.10 in 1990 to 1.82 in 1992. These figures explain why Wisconsin utilities have been significant sellers of Phase I allowances: in order to meet the state restriction, Phase I units have already overcomplied with the CAAA restriction.
14 At the same time, at least one Wisconsin utility has begun to purchase allowances for use in Phase II. Though we can say roughly which plants should increase and which should reduce emissions, we cannot say precisely how abatement would be distributed across plants in a least-cost outcome. At an equilibrium in the SO allowance market, 2 
Ž
. r x, u should be approximately equal across plants. Methods extending those we 2 used can be employed to examine the equilibrium properties of a utility industry with allowance trading. If input price information were known, one could construct plant-level cost functions using nonparametric methods. These objects could be used to devise an industry-wide abatement cost function, which could in turn be minimized subject to an aggregate emissions constraint and possibly some firmspecific capacity constraints. The resulting solution would constitute a more complete description of optimal environmental compliance decision making. It would also yield the equilibrium allowance price and a description of allowance market behavior, complementing the abatement cost function results of Atkinson w x and Tietenberg 1
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As the U.S. electric utility industry prepares to meet the requirements of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA, many of the law's effects remain uncertain. Yet utilities have been asked to make compliance decisions that can involve investments of hundreds of millions of dollars. Their decisions depend in an essential way upon the price at which allowances will trade. In this paper we employed a distance function technique to extract the shadow price of SO emissions from a data set 2 containing production information for a collection of Wisconsin coal-burning electric utilities. The empirical approach uses the output distance function, which captures the technological relationship between inputs and outputs, and the corresponding dual information contained in a revenue function. Our method, being nonstochastic, provides no information concerning the precision of the shadow price estimates. With a larger data set this deficiency could be remedied with the use of stochastic methods.
From the estimated output distance function parameters we found for the Wisconsin utilities in our data set the average shadow price of SO emissions to be 2 $292.70 per ton. This number is commensurate with other recent estimates of the marginal cost of abatement for coal plants in the Midwest region, but well above the price at which allowances have changed hands recently. As Phase II of the CAAA draws near, the plants in our sample will need to reduce their emissions still further. We expect that shadow prices will be driven up, and the purchase of Phase II allowances at current prices will become a still better bargain.
Meanwhile, the absence of scrubbed plants in our data set limits the applicability of our shadow price results. We defer to a later study the extension of the method to a larger data set. It appears, though, that our results validate the distance function methodology in an instance with timely and important consequences for an actual environmental policy problem. It seems likely that the methodology will prove useful in other industries facing new or newly stringent environmental restrictions. One advantage to our approach lies in its modest data requirements. It relies only on readily available observed output and input data. It requires no information concerning individual plant production functions. Consequently, similar studies could be conducted and the results applied to other states or regions.
